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Leap year 2012 
We all wish that “Europe 2012” be a 
different – and better – year than the 
one experienced in 2011. 
Indeed, 2012 is expected to be 
delivery time for a new multi-pronged 
system encompassing tighter 
monitoring and scrutiny of national 
budgets, a more flexible approach to 
crisis management by the European 
Central Bank, and possibly even 
some initial form of “stability bonds” 
as sketched by the Commission. It is 
widely understood that only a 
combination of all these ingredients 
will eventually do the trick. And it is 
also to be hoped that 2012 will bring 
agreement on their precise mix, 
sequencing and phasing-in. 
Delivering on all this is crucial to 
offering a more convincing response 
to international markets – but also to 
our citizens. The growth forecasts 
for 2012, in fact, are bleak enough to 
raise concerns about the impact of 
the austerity measures adopted by 
many euro zone members. Their 
combined effect  i s  a l ready 
prompting a recession which may, in 
turn, exacerbate the fiscal difficulties 
of most EU countries. If Europe is 
increasingly – worse, exclusively – 
identified with internal recession and 
external “intrusion”, the risk of a 
major backlash at societal level is 
bound to grow. Populism is already 
on the rise and can make well-
balanced and effective compromises 
at EU level ever more difficult to 
achieve. 
But a new year is, above all, an 
occasion for good will resolutions 
and renewed hope. 2012 is also a 
leap year (the year of the Dragon in 
the Chinese calendar) and therefore 
a special one by nature and 
definition. Moreover, European 
national football teams will face one 
another in Poland and Ukraine, and 
London will host the Olympic 
Games. 
It will, in other words, be a time of 
risk and a time of opportunity for all. 
Accordingly, this special issue of 
BEPA Monthly Brief dwells on the 
challenges the EU may be 
confronted with next, and highlights 
the need for a new leap in the 
integration process.  
It includes a shortened version of an 
internal policy brief a team of BEPA 
advisers drafted before Christmas to 
highlight precisely that: the risks and 
the opportunities for “Europe 
2012”. 
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The big question for the EU in 2012 is not only: 
“will it solve the debt crisis?” It is also: “will it 
survive the solution?” Lurking behind the debt crisis 
is a growth crisis, in particular with austerity policies 
imposed across Member States, along with a 
competitiveness crisis for Southern Europe. These 
three crises will fester even if the debt-related one 
were to be resolved by the “big bazookas”. 
So how does the EU restart growth across 
Europe and rebuild competitiveness in the 
South, in particular in light of a “fiscal compact” 
that prescribes one-size-fits-all budgetary 
austerity for all euro zone members? The devil is 
in the details – and those details involve not just 
economics but also governance and politics. 
Rules for laws 
Details have seemed to bedevil EU agreements 
of late. The 9-10 December meeting of 
EU leaders that proposed an intergovernmental 
agreement outside the treaties has left 
EU officials scrambling to find ways to allow this 
to be done. And the contents of that agreement, 
much like those coming out of previous such 
meetings, have come up against the hard realities 
of the markets as, time after time, the details of 
the proposed solutions have not lived up to 
market expectations. But they also come up 
against the arcane rules of EU governance. If 
nothing else, the British “veto” of the Franco-
German proposal for a EU-wide fiscal union 
demonstrates that the euro zone is also suffering 
from a crisis involving its decision rules, and in 
particular the unanimity rule for treaties. 
The way most experts think about getting 
around the unanimity rule is by moving toward 
qualified majority voting (QMV). But this cannot 
work where new issues not already covered by 
the treaties are concerned. Nor should it: 
sovereignty is at issue here, and in an EU in 
which there is still insufficient common identity, 
political community, or sense of legitimacy to 
allow for a majority of states to impose on a 
minority in the absence of already negotiated 
EU-level control, QMV cannot work. 
Supermajorities with opt-outs, however, could 
work. The British opposition to the “fiscal 
compact” is a perfect test case for this. The 
British do not want to play, but they should not 
spoil the game for the others. Now is the time 
for the Member States to agree that in special 
circumstances they will go for supermajorities 
(say, four-fifths or 85%), with an opt-out for the 
one or two countries that do not want to play 
(and it is always one or two). This would avoid 
the uncertainties of a Schengen-like 
intergovernmental agreement outside the treaties. 
Overlapping ovals? 
What would the European Union look like as a 
result? Not the core with concentric circles that 
many now evoke. Rather, beyond the Single 
Market to which everyone belongs, the EU 
should be seen as consisting of overlapping 
policy communities. Those Member States that 
belong to all such policy communities might 
constitute a “core”, but this would not lead to 
concentric circles around that core. Rather, 
visualize this as ovals in which greater or lesser 
parts of each oval overlap with the others – with 
the Single Market as an all-encompassing circle. 
Accordingly, the euro zone would certainly 
constitute a major policy community, without 
Britain, Denmark and Sweden. But security and 
defence would include Britain as a key member 
along with France, Germany and others (but not 
Denmark); and Schengen would be yet another, 
with Britain out and Denmark in. Were 
“enhanced cooperation” to gain traction, we 
could envision an even wider range of 
overlapping policy communities of greater or 
lesser significance. 
Deeper fiscal integration could also create more 
overlapping policy communities. But here, the 
mistake some have made is to assume that 
deeper integration that includes not just taxation 
but also labour markets (as Sarkozy announced) 
would mean that all 17+ would move forward 
together. 
1 Europe 2012: The devil is in the details 
By Vivien A. Schmidt* 
Vivien A. Schmidt is Jean Monnet Professor of European Integration and Director of the Center for the Study of Europe at Boston University.  
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EU Member States have such different varieties 
of capitalism, with different growth models, 
financial market profiles, production systems, 
labour markets and wage-bargaining systems, 
pension and health care arrangements, systems of 
taxation, and so on. It would be impossible to 
agree to common rules without potentially 
harming the variety that makes for the strength of 
the EU’s economy. Yet one could easily envision 
different “enhanced cooperation zones” in many 
of these areas. For example, why not set up 
“zones of enhanced labor mobility” among 
member-states with reconcilable arrangements in 
pensions, health care systems, or labour contracts 
(say, continental countries like the Netherlands, 
Belgium, Luxembourg, Austria and Germany)? 
Flexible sticks, conditional carrots 
But once we are talking about the details of deeper 
fiscal integration, we also need to consider the 
“fiscal compact” itself. The recourse to automatic 
rules to reduce macroeconomic excesses is highly 
problematic, given the great differences in Member 
States’ political economies. Thinking that all 
countries can achieve Northern levels of export-
oriented growth if they just stick to the German 
“culture of stability” spells a “culture of decline” 
for much of Southern Europe. The plans for the 
European Semester suggest that the Commission 
will pay attention to countries’ differences. But the 
rules to be applied (based on the numbers set out 
in the Stability and Growth Pact and refined in 
subsequent agreements) do not allow for much 
flexibility. 
There may be ways around this, however. If 
there were to be flexibility in what counts 
towards the budget deficit, in how fast it is to be 
reduced, or in which part of the accumulated 
debt is to be addressed, then the “fill-in-the 
numbers” approach might still work. For 
example, why not leave off the balance sheets 
growth-enhancing investments in infrastructure 
projects, education, training, research and 
development? 
Beyond this, the EU itself needs to do much more 
to help Member States in trouble. For investment, 
a recapitalised European Investment Bank (EIB) 
could be a way to jumpstart a Europe-wide 
investment programme. Moreover, “Social 
Europe” has been sorely absent in the face of a 
rapid increase in poverty, inequality, and 
unemployment. The structural funds designed to 
promote economic development in regions in need 
have gone mostly unused by the poorest Southern 
European regions. And the European globalization 
adjustment fund (EGF), set up to address 
unemployment problems resulting from 
globalization, turns out to have disbursed almost 
no money in 2010 (as reported by the Financial 
Times). If the EU wants to win the battle of hearts 
and minds, it needs to demonstrate that it offers 
not just sticks but also carrots. 
The Member States in trouble themselves would 
benefit from more EU carrots. But as we know, 
they also need to do more with regard to sticks. 
This is not easy, in particular for countries that 
have already been struggling with austerity 
programmes for the past couple of years. And it is 
certainly not going to work if governments’ only 
refrain in justification for more sticks is: “The devil 
(read: the EU/IMF) made me do it.” Rather, 
national governments also need to offer carrots – 
i.e. growth enhancing and poverty alleviation 
programmes – alongside structural reform. 
A fourth crisis? 
Politics remains an issue for any reform effort, as 
it does for the perception of the EU’s role. 
Euro-scepticism is on the rise both in Southern 
Europe, where citizens see the EU as imposing 
unnecessarily harsh austerity to placate Northern 
Europe; and in the North, where citizens see the 
EU as imposing unnecessarily high costs in 
bailing out the South. Moreover, populist parties 
(in particular on the extreme right) have been 
benefiting greatly from the crisis, as they shift 
their emphasis from anti-Muslim to anti-
European politics. The problem for the EU as 
well as national governments is that if the reform 
efforts succeed, and growth takes off, then 
citizens may gain renewed faith in national and 
EU level democracy. But if they don’t work, yet 
another crisis will ensue, beyond the debt, 
growth, and competitiveness crises. And that is 
the crisis of democracy. 
Let us hope that 2012 begins to address all three 
economic crises, so that the fourth (political) one 
does not ensue. The European project itself 
hangs in the balance. 
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2 Europe 2012: Risks and opportunities 
This text is a synthesis of an internal policy brief drafted by 
an ad hoc group of BEPA advisers right before the 
Christmas break.  
THE EU ECONOMY 
At the start of the new year, important decisions 
are expected to be finalised in order to tame the 
euro zone crisis that has escalated since early 2010. 
The interplay between budgetary austerity and 
growth prospects will be a crucial test for all in 
both economic and political terms. 
Risks 
The only way to avoid a nightmare scenario 
around the euro is to reassure investors that 
solvent euro zone governments will be able to 
refinance their debts at sustainable rates and that 
the euro is going to survive in its current form. 
And to reassure the ECB and markets that 
governments remain committed to making the 
euro work, a roadmap towards Eurobonds needs 
to be drawn up, subject to strict conditionality and 
tied to a credible mechanism for ensuring fiscal 
prudence. 
Even if this nightmare scenario is avoided, 2012 is 
going to be an extremely difficult year. All the 
signs suggest the euro zone is already in recession 
and this is likely to get worse in 2012. Even 
German GDP looks set to shrink. Recession, high 
unemployment and budget cuts will place severe 
pressure on welfare systems. As unemployment 
rises and incomes are squeezed, the political 
backlash and social unrest are likely to grow. 
History shows that economies take a long time to 
recover after financial crises. The lost output is not 
recovered. Unemployment persists and crunched 
credit depresses investment. So, even if the acute 
phase of the crisis (the financial panic) is resolved 
in early 2012, the chronic phase – prolonged 
stagnation while households, banks and 
governments restore their balance-sheets and 
capital and labour are shifted to more productive 
uses – will be a drag on growth for many years. 
Opportunities 
Structural reforms are necessary but not sufficient 
to stimulate growth in 2012: given that demand is 
depressed and credit crunched, the more 
productive jobs and businesses that will eventually 
boost growth will take longer than usual to appear. 
Supportive monetary policy is essential. This 
involves ensuring a “smooth transmission of 
monetary policy” – i.e. maintaining low interest 
rates throughout the euro zone, preventing a 
decline in the money supply and supporting bank 
credit to the real economy. 
A more competitive (i.e. much weaker) euro would 
help. Markets seem to be delivering this now. 
A weaker euro would be particularly helpful for 
Mediterranean economies whose exports are more 
price-sensitive. 
Fiscal support is also important. Governments 
that cannot borrow cheaply (or at all) from 
markets have no option but to adjust. But they 
should maintain investment in skills and 
infrastructure, while cutting subsidies and transfer 
payments. They should also accelerate necessary 
reforms, such as raising the official retirement age 
and encouraging people to work longer. Slashing 
payroll taxes and replacing the revenues with 
higher VAT could also help. Governments that 
can borrow at unprecedentedly low rates can and 
must play their role in supporting demand. 
Measures to promote investment are needed at 
national and EU level. At a national level, these 
could include making it easier to start a business 
and improving SMEs’ access to finance (by 
encouraging venture capital and, if necessary, 
providing partial government guarantees for banks 
lending to SMEs). At EU level, it is vital to greatly 
increase the capital of the EIB in order to finance 
a big wave of pan-European investment. 
Countries with a current-account surplus must 
play their part in the intra-euro zone adjustment. 
SINGLE MARKET 
Risks 
The ongoing crisis, deepening austerity and rising 
unemployment will place a severe strain on the 
Single Market, as it did in 2008/09. National 
politicians will come under increasing pressure to 
support and protect domestic industries and jobs 
in ways incompatible with the Single Market. The 
crisis is also threatening the Single Market in 
financial services, as funding difficulties and fears 
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of a euro break-up push banks to repatriate their 
lending and activities back to their home countries. 
Opportunities 
The Single Market also provides opportunities to 
create growth and jobs by fully implementing the 
Services Directive and the first wave of 12 Single 
Market Act measures. Much more could be done 
to broaden and deepen the Single Market. The 
“Cost of non-Europe” study, led by BEPA, will 
deliver initial conclusions in the summer and final 
ones by the end of 2012. It will shed light on the 
potential for further integration and its likely 
impact on growth and jobs, identifying the sectors 
with the most potential and the barriers to a better 
functioning market. 
INDUSTRY AND RESEARCH 
Risks 
A lack of financing and weak demand will 
continue to hit industrial investment, SME growth 
and business start-ups. This will fan fears about 
the hollowing out of Europe’s industrial base and 
its impact on jobs and innovation. 
Both private and public investment in R&D is 
expected to decline, undermining Europe’s 
capacity to innovate and grow, and pushing the 
EU even further behind the US. In some Member 
States public investment will fall below the level 
needed to sustain an adequate research sector, 
damaging the competitiveness of already weak 
industrial sectors. 
Cuts in higher-education budgets, which will be 
severe in some Member States, may lead to a 
further rationalisation of the sector: more mergers, 
strategic cross-border cooperation, and debate on 
tuition fees and the importance of attracting 
students from outside the EU. 
Opportunities 
To mitigate the impact of the fall in R&D, a 
strong (legislative) impulse to the European 
Research Area could offer opportunities to do 
more with less. At a national level, funding cuts 
might – and arguably should – force countries to 
concentrate their research efforts on certain 
sectors (“smart specialisation”), so as to achieve 
critical mass and impact. At EU level, a more 
targeted industrial policy, together with an 
ambitious second phase of the Single Market Act, 
could boost sectors with high growth potential by 
removing regulatory and financing obstacles. 
TRADE 
Risks 
The euro zone crisis and global economic 
slowdown could trigger a resurgence of 
protectionism. Deepening recession and rising 
unemployment in Europe are likely to increase 
protectionist pressures. The response could take a 
conventional form – e.g. an increase in anti-
dumping investigations – or a novel one: a carbon 
tax on imports and other forms of “green” 
protectionism. WTO disputes may also flare up. 
The bigger risk is a global trade war, which the 
euro zone crisis might help precipitate. So far, 
countries have been squeezed between the US, 
which has driven down the dollar through its 
quantitative easing, and China, which has 
limited the appreciation of the renminbi against 
the dollar and whose currency has therefore 
weakened against those of many other 
countries. The big danger is that the euro zone 
also starts to engage in such policies. While the 
G20 might help deter an outbreak of hostilities, 
its declarations to resist protectionism have so 
far proven largely toothless. 
Opportunities 
While the Doha Round remains stuck, 2012 could 
be a good year for the EU’s bilateral trade 
agreements. A deal with Ukraine was almost 
initialled in December, then temporarily frozen for 
political reasons; negotiations with Canada and 
Singapore might also be completed in 2012; those 
with India could make decisive progress too. The 
second half of the year might even offer a window 
of opportunity for finally concluding an 
association agreement with Mercosur, although 
many obstacles remain. 
ENERGY AND CLIMATE 
Risks 
Recession and high unemployment are likely to 
test many Member States’ commitment to 
introduce costly measures to tackle climate change. 
At a global level, while the international climate 
negotiations struggle on after Durban, there is a 
risk that this slow-moving process be killed by the 
withdrawal of one or more of the major parties to 
the negotiations. 
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The EU is very vulnerable to supply disruptions 
and/or soaring energy prices. Events in the Middle 
East, North Africa and the Gulf could cause oil 
prices to soar from their current level of around 
$100 a barrel to $200 or more. Gas supplies from 
Russia might also be disrupted, particularly in the 
first three months of the year, by ongoing tensions 
between Gazprom and the main transit countries, 
Ukraine and Belarus. 
Opportunities 
The slow progress in the global climate 
negotiations provides the opportunity for a post-
Durban rethink of the EU’s climate-change 
strategy. For example, the EU could consider 
support for a green venture-capital industry, an 
initiative to free global trade in environmental 
services and end harmful subsidies, and a pluri-
lateral approach (i.e. with key players first) to 
climate negotiations. 
Energy policy also offers windows. Together with 
completing the single market in energy and 
developing alternative supplies – such as shale gas 
– and supply routes, validating the Commission’s 
entitlement to obtain information on bilateral 
energy deals between Member States and third 
countries would be a big step forward for 
EU energy policy. 
E 
THE EU AND THE WORLD 
The global outlook for 2012 will be characterised 
by transitions to new administrations in the US, 
Russia and China and by uncertain transitions in 
the EU neighbourhoods.Unexpected events (the 
so-called “black swans”) may also trigger new 
developments. 
Risks 
For the first time since the middle of the 
20th century, negative developments in Europe 
may produce shockwaves in the wider world. 
Economic recession, a possible collapse of the 
euro zone, a general banking crisis, a resurgence of 
protectionism could all affect the global system 
and trigger a spiral of actions and reactions. This 
would not only weaken the EU’s hand in 
multilateral bodies and fora but also strain (or even 
disrupt) ongoing negotiations and processes. 
Opportunities 
The EU should emphasise inter-dependence and 
inter-connectedness and thus foster concerted and 
cooperative action at global level. In the IMF 
framework, this could lead to a further power shift 
between the “West” and the “rest”. By driving 
rather then being reluctantly dragged into this 
process, Europe could pursue a new balance 
between formal presence and informal influence, 
thus binding the BRICS more tightly into a shared 
multilateral logic. But the overriding challenge for 
the EU will be to get out the messages to strategic 
partners/G 20 members about its response to the 
crisis and the need for common solutions, building 
on those agreed at the G 20 summit in Cannes. 
This task is most urgent in Asia, with Latin 
America not far behind. 
UNITED STATES 
Risks  
The US will have a long and uncertain presidential 
campaign. More aggressive public rhetoric on both 
trade and macro-economic financial issues from 
both parties as the campaign progresses cannot be 
ruled out (with eco-taxes on airlines as a domain to 
be watched carefully). As a result, the Obama 
administration may have to act in a more robust 
and “selfish” way in a number of areas. 
Opportunities 
The EU should monitor the campaign carefully 
and assiduously, and foster close contacts with 
both Democrat and Republican leaders in the 
coming months – in particular as the position of 
the Republican Party becomes clearer – with a 
view to preparing the ground for substantial 
breakthroughs in 2013. The recently established 
High Level Working Group on Jobs and Growth 
also constitutes a key platform to build on in the 
immediate future. 
RUSSIA 
Risks 
The partially unexpected outcome of the recent 
elections for the Duma and the ensuing protests in 
Moscow cast a new light on the forthcoming 
presidential elections. What initially appeared as a 
foregone conclusion is now clouded in uncertainty 
over the unfolding of the campaign, including the 
possibility that Vladimir Putin is forced to a run-
off. Whether this is the dawn of a Russian 
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“spring” or a source of unrest and turmoil is 
unclear – but it is nonetheless likely to have 
consequences on the way in which Russia is run, 
domestically as well as on the international scene. 
Different views on that may emerge during or 
after the vote, however, rendering Russian policy 
less predictable. 
Opportunities 
The atmosphere of the recent summit on 
15 December was constructive, with progress on 
visa, energy, aviation and some foreign policy 
issues (including Syria). President Medvedev’s own 
position following the March elections is still 
unclear, but there was agreement to look on how 
to engage deeper and better on trade and 
investment issues following Russian accession to 
the WTO. If this is a shared long-term analysis – 
and especially if Prime Minister Putin, once elected 
President, decides to start reforming the system – 
there will be room for incremental progress. On 
top of that, the demands raised by the 
demonstrators in Moscow are fully in line with 
most EU positions. If Putin listens, this could 
further contribute to better relations – both 
bilaterally and regionally. 
CHINA 
Risks 
Changes at the top of party and state, to be 
finalised between March and October, are unlikely 
to bring major changes in the short term, much as 
they are still difficult to read. Xi Jinping is 
expected to take over as President and Li Keqiang 
as Prime Minister: both are prominent members 
of the Standing Committee of the ruling party, 
whose composition is also due to be refreshed 
significantly. While China is unlikely to change 
course rapidly, the combined pressure of slower 
economic growth, social pressure domestically, 
and possibly unfavourable developments in East 
Asia (North Korea after Kim Jong Il’s death, 
Taiwan after the January presidential elections) 
may challenge China internally and trigger action 
externally. 
Opportunities 
The pre-transition situation in the country has 
already affected the agenda of bilateral meetings 
and should perhaps prompt some rethinking on 
the EU side. Considering also that China’s 
position has been broadly constructive at the 
international level (IMF, euro zone crisis), it will be 
important to maintain political level exchanges in 
person on the global economic situation and on 
the market access, investment and intellectual 
property nexus, as the window for using the lever 
of granting China “market economy status” in the 
WTO is closing rapidly (it will be granted anyway 
in 2016). 
NEIGHBOURHOODS 
Risks 
After the “strategic surprise” of the Arab spring(s) 
in early 2011, the democratisation process in the 
Arab world is now encountering major difficulties 
(Egypt) and rising violence (Syria). Elections in 
Tunisia, Morocco and Egypt (where the process 
continues well into 2012) have also signalled the 
emergence of parties of Islamic inspiration – some 
relatively moderate, some more radical – who are 
now likely to shape the policies of coalition 
governments and a setback for secular and liberal 
forces. This could have consequences in terms of 
both domestic (sharia law) and foreign policy, and 
go against Western and European interests and 
values. Uncertainty and instability may come to 
characterise 2012 in the Southern neighbourhood, 
while the pursuit and consolidation of democracy 
in the Eastern neighbourhood continues to be 
slow and piecemeal. 
Opportunities 
The EU may have to rethink its notion of stability. 
The current wave of democratisation is more 
complex than previous ones and raises new and 
sensitive dilemmas: this could apply also to 
Palestine, where a much-awaited election is in the 
cards now and may speed up the bid for 
recognition at the UN in September. 
The EU should resist the temptation to pick 
winners and fully engage with legitimately elected 
governments; it should be patient and consistent 
in supporting rule of law and human rights; and it 
should invest on rulers while relying on societies 
rather than parties. The EU should also make the 
most of the limited resources and tools it has now 
and build “success stories” where it can (and is 
allowed to): in Tunisia, for instance, in Morocco 
and possibly – in the East – Moldova. 
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Mapping EU Strategic Partnerships 
Bilateral strategic partnerships offer a flexible in-
frastructure through which to address political 
tensions and pave the way for cooperation in a 
complex global environment. After two decades 
of discrete developments, the European Council 
gave EU strategic partnerships a new impetus in 
September 2010. This mapping exercise offers the 
first comparative overview of partnerships with 
10 countries of systemic importance, including the 
US and the BRICS. Based on extensive data and 
forecasts (economics, population, military, etc.), it 
reveals not only the heterogeneity of EU strategic 
partners, but also the potential for enhanced coo-
peration. Strategic partnerships result both from 
choice and necessity, whereby shared values do 
not always go hand in hand with common action. 
EU current domestic troubles challenge its consis-
tence as a foreign policy actor and its ability to 
make good use of these partnerships. 
http://www.fride.org/publication/956/mapping-eu-
strategic-partnerships 
Four scenarios for the reinvention of Europe 
Popular discontent with the EU and a “clash of 
civilizations” among Member States currently 
dominate the debate. This paper analyses the 
possible routes for managing the euro debt crisis. 
According to the first scenario, asymmetric integra-
tion, the EU would continue its search for incre-
mental solutions at the risk of failing to resolve 
the crisis, exacerbating citizens’ anger and shif-
ting to a power-based EU. A smaller Eurozone 
would be more sustainable, but could unleash a 
tsunami of panic culminating with the downfall 
of the euro and a deep recession. Political union 
through treaty change would be the most inclu-
sive option, but would carry the risk of democra-
tic rejection, thus paradoxically leading to disin-
tegration. Federalism without the federalists, namely 
Eurozone’s integration outside the scope of exis-
ting treaties, would open a gulf within the EU 
and marginalise the core EU17 globally. 
h t t p : / / w w w . e c f r . e u / p a g e / - /
ECFR43_REINVENTION_OF_EUROPE_ESSAY_AW1.pdf 
Dealing with debt crises in the Eurozone 
As it currently stands, the European Stability Me-
chanism (ESM) suffers from several weaknesses: 
no clear distinction between illiquidity and insol-
vency; high rates; volume requirements threatening 
Member States ratings. This paper provides an 
overview of what a more comprehensive frame-
work for sovereign debt crisis management and 
prevention could look like. A permanent liquidity 
fund with sufficient volume should first provide 
loans to countries experiencing payment difficulties 
with clear conditions and strict monitoring. A bank 
recapitalisation fund should directly inject capital 
into banks and allow for a one-off restructuring of 
public debt while sparing a systemic banking crisis. 
Eurobonds of up to 60 percent of GDP would 
ensure that the ESM can remain within reasonable 
limits while providing liquidity support to large 
Member States. Lastly, substantially strengthened 
macroeconomic policy coordination could tackle 
long-term macroeconomic imbalances. 
http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/
research_papers/2011_RP11_Dullien_swd_ks.pdf  
Foreign currency indebtedness 
This commentary provides a fresh outlook on the 
risk of excessive foreign currency indebtedness. 
Loans made primarily by Nordic banks to Central 
Europe soared in the last decade and increased du-
ring the financial crisis. In 2010, more than 70% of 
overall credit in the Baltic States was granted in 
foreign currency. The European Systemic Risk 
Board (ERSB) recently warned against the expo-
sure of borrowers and lenders. In countries with 
floating exchange rates, debt servicing costs have 
risen. Where currencies are pegged to the euro, 
governments have no choice but to adopt austerity 
measures that deteriorate the output. In both cases, 
default risk is high. The ERSB recommends rein-
forcing a preventive attitude to foreign currency 
lending. Central European countries, however, 
should focus on consolidating their institutional 
and monetary credibility to support local currency 
lending and reduce their vulnerability. 
http://www.ceps.eu/book/foreign-currency-indebtedness-
potential-systemic-risk-emerging-europe 
3 Think Tank Twitter 
Think Tank Twitter (TTT) aims to provide regular information and updates on what is produced by think tanks and research centres across 
Europe (and beyond) on EU policy issues. As an analogy to the original Twitter, each summary – or tweet – does not exceed 140 words, rather 
than characters. Those who wish to signal new publications for possible inclusion can send them to the email address bepa-think-tank-
twitter@ec.europa.eu 
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University autonomy in Europe II:  
The scorecard 
A recent study prepared by the European Uni-
versity Association (EUA) and conducted in 
26 European countries demonstrates that the 
economic crisis and the austerity measures sub-
sequently adopted are leading to reduced finan-
cial autonomy. Public funding is diminishing and 
so is the capacity of institutions to manage their 
budgets. Such developments are a cause for 
concern as they can hinder the capacity of uni-
versities to overcome the crisis successfully. Ins-
titutions are rated and ranked in four areas: orga-
nisation, financing, staffing and academic auto-
nomy. Globally, the UK is at the top and Greek 
universities are the least autonomous. In some 
countries, national reforms aimed at improving 
autonomy have been recently introduced without 
allocating human resources or management sup-
port. EUA calls on public authorities and the 
European Commission to support universities in 
this area. 
ht tp ://www.eua .b e/Librar i e s/Publ i ca t i ons/
U n i v e r s i t y _ A u t o n o m y _ i n _ E u r o p e _ I I _ -
_The_Scorecard.sflb.ashx 
The EU, still seeking legitimacy 
This interview addresses questions of EU legiti-
macy. While early European integration efforts 
drew on the consensual objective for peace, 
completing the Single market and adopting the 
euro in a global competitive environment has 
proved more difficult. The traditional “output 
legitimacy” of the EU has eroded, while impro-
ving the democratic features of its institutions 
has not convinced voters and failed to create a 
vivid European public space. Divisive issues (e.g. 
tax, security, social, health policies) are still large-
ly debated at national level. “Consensus ethic” 
has prevented mainstream political groups in the 
EP to engage in more frank discussions. In that 
respect, the appointment of the EC President 
according to the results of the EP elections, as 
stipulated in the Treaty of Lisbon, should contri-
bute to politicise and further legitimise the EU. 
h t t p : / / w w w . n o t r e - e u r o p e . e u / u p l o a d s /
tx_pub l i ca t i on/EUSt i l lSe ek ingLeg i t imacy_-
_NotreEurope_-_Nov_2011.pdf 
 
Concentrating solar power: Its potential 
contribution to a sustainable energy future 
This report analyses a recent study by the Euro-
pean Academies Science Advisory Council 
(EASAC) on the current status and challenges of 
concentrating solar power (CSP). Alongside pho-
tovoltaic electricity generation, this commercially 
available technology has the potential to harness 
the immense solar resource in Southern Europe, 
the Middle East and North Africa. According to 
CSP, a high-temperature heat source is created 
by concentrating the sun’s rays to produce elec-
tricity in a thermodynamic cycle. According to 
EASAC, CSP could make a substantial contribu-
tion to meeting future EU energy needs and sus-
tainability targets for 2050. The report identifies 
the need for sustained research to achieve the 
full cost reduction (50-60%). Cooperation with 
the MENA countries on CSP could also be used 
to support democratic reforms and develop a 
mutually beneficial partnership. 
h t t p : //www .easac . e u/ f i l e a dm i n/Rep o r t s /
Easac_CSP_Web-Final.pdf 
 
The EU and migration: A call for action 
Tackling anti-EU and anti-immigrant feelings 
requires delivering better migration policy. In 
response to evidence that migration is here to 
stay and is economically beneficial to European 
societies, this paper outlines the steps needed to 
manage immigration more effectively at EU le-
vel. Clear legal routes for labour immigration 
should be established and linked to identified 
shortages of skills, whereas family migration 
must be scrutinised more closely. On asylum, 
EU Member States should agree on a common 
proposal for amending the 1951 Geneva 
Convention so as to restrict its scope to the most 
serious cases of distress. Mobility partnerships 
should be put at the heart of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy. Finally, Frontex should 
be given more extensive means to monitor and 
tackle the challenges that the most-exposed first 
countries of entry (e.g. Greece) face. 
h t t p ://www.cer . o r g . uk/s i t e s/d e f au l t/ f i l e s/
p u b l i c a t i o n s / a t t a c h m e n t s / p d f / 2 0 1 1 /
essay_migration_clarke_1dec11-4208.pdf 
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Arrivées et départs 
Le 1er décembre dernier, Adriana Oltean est 
venue renforcer le secrétariat du Groupe 
européen d’éthique (EGE) et remplacer Lauren 
O’Connor, qui quitte le BEPA.  
Le 6 décembre, le Président Barroso a 
officiellement annoncé la nomination d’Anne 
Glover au poste de Conseiller Scientifique 
Principal (Chief Scientific Adviser). Biologiste de 
formation, Anne Glover occupait précédemment 
les mêmes responsabilités auprès du 
gouvernement écossais. Elle a pris ses fonctions 
le 1er janvier 2012 et est rattachée 
administrativement au BEPA. 
Fin décembre, Sony Kapoor, directeur du think 
tank Re-Define, a quitté le BEPA où il avait le 
statut de visiteur depuis le mois de juin. Sony a 
notamment produit un rapport analysant les 
dysfonctionnements des marchés financiers et 
proposant des mesures nouvelles afin de rétablir 
le lien entre la finance et l’économie réelle. 
Evénements 
Trois conseillers du BEPA, João Marques de 
Almeida, Eric Peters, Baudouin Regout, étaient 
en mission au Brésil du 28 novembre au 
3 décembre avec des représentants d’autres DGs 
et du SEAE, dans le cadre d’une invitation 
adressée à la Commission européenne par le 
gouvernement brésilien. Cette semaine 
d’échanges et de rencontres informelles a permis 
d’établir des contacts privilégiés au sein des 
décideurs brésiliens publics (Sénat, Ministère des 
Affaires étrangères…) et privés (industrie, 
finance, agro-business…). Elle a été l’occasion de 
constater une nouvelle fois le potentiel 
considérable du partenariat stratégique UE-Brésil 
et la volonté d’approfondir davantage les 
relations entre l’Union et le Mercosur. 
Activités à venir 
Le 24 janvier 2012, le Président Barroso rendra 
hommage à Diogo Vasconcelos, figure de 
l’innovation sociale européenne, disparu 
prématurément en juillet dernier. Diogo 
Vasconcelos a notamment présidé le “Business 
Panel on future EU innovation policy” en 2009-
2010. Dans le cadre de ses multiples 
engagements, il a soutenu le démarrage du projet 
“Hiriko Driving Mobility” qui sera présenté au 
Berlaymont le 24 janvier. Il s’agit d’un modèle de 
voiture électrique rétractable, qui fait l’objet de 
plusieurs partenariats avec de grandes villes 
européennes (Malmö, Berlin, Barcelone) et 
américaines (San Francisco). Le projet de 
produire localement le véhicule en recrutant des 
personnes éloignées du marché du travail font 
d’Hiriko un modèle d’innovation sociale et 
environnementale à échelle industrielle. 
Le 24 janvier, le BEPA organise également la 
présentation du rapport Innovation flagship on 
Golden Growth de la Banque Mondiale, qui 
propose une évaluation du modèle de croissance 
européen. La Secrétaire générale de la 
Commission Catherine Day introduira la 
discussion et la présidence danoise sera 
représentée. 
Le 25 janvier, le BEPA présidera un séminaire 
consacré au thème de la sécurité alimentaire. 
Cette discussion se tient dans un contexte 
marqué par une montée des inquiétudes et des 
troubles sociaux liés à la raréfaction des 
ressources, à la volatilité des prix agricoles et au 
changement climatique. Les deux principaux 
intervenants seront Luc Guyau, Président 
indépendant du Conseil de l’Organisation pour 
l’Agriculture et l’Alimentation (FAO), et Olivier 
de Schutter, Rapporteur spécial des Nations 
Unies pour le “droit à l’alimentation”. 
4 BEPA News 
Helle Thorning-Schmidt et le Président Barroso, à l’occasion de 
la première rencontre entre la Présidence danoise et le Collège de 
la Commission, le 11 janvier 2012. 
